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ABSTRACT
Vietnam stands at an important crossroad in its transition from a planned to market
oriented economy. Since the implementation of economic reform starting with Doi
Moi in 1986, supplemented with further reform from 1989, the economy experienced
rapid economic growth during the period of the 1990s until 1997. Since this time
GDP growth has noticeably slowed, partly due to the onset of the financial and
economic crisis to afflict the region in 1997-98, and partly due to a disconcerting, and
related, decline in foreign direct investment flows. Despite this adverse development
there has been a remarkable transformation of the economy that has seen it become
more globally oriented, as exemplified by a rapid growth of both exports and imports
and with a significant contribution to the economy from the foreign invested sector.
For Vietnam to once again re-establish high and sustainable rates of economic growth
will require further restructuring and reform efforts. In particular, this will require
further progress in: establishing the institutional framework necessary for a market
economy; ownership reform; encouraging foreign direct investment; allowing the
private sector a larger role in the management and ownership of currently state owned
enterprises; allowing unviable state owned assets to be liquidated and their assets put
to more productive usage; and encouraging fair competition between different
ownership forms, with the state, as a buyer, not discriminating against any form of
ownership. These should form the core of the country’s competition policy.
This paper focuses upon the need for competition policy to encourage the nurturing,
growth and development, specifically, of private sector small and medium enterprises
(SMEs). Private entrepreneurship and enterprise reform can play a crucial role in the
reform of the Vietnamese economy. Establishing a dynamic non-state manufacturing
sector, with an emphasis on SMEs, will be a precondition for attaining the twin
objectives of (1) restructuring and slimming state enterprises and (2) expanding nonfarm employment and income opportunities. SMEs have the potential for job creation,
contributing to sustainable economic development, allocating resources more
efficiently, expanding exports, achieving a more equal distribution of incomes, and
assist in rural and regional development.
Paper presented at an AusAid-APEC Workshop on Anti-trust Law and Competition
Policy, 3-4 July 2001, Ministry of Trade, Hanoi, Vietnam.
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1.

Introduction

Vietnam stands at an important crossroad in its transition from a planned to market
oriented economy. Since the implementation of economic reform starting with Doi
Moi in 1986, supplemented with further reform from 1989, the economy experienced
rapid economic growth during the period of the 1990s until 1997. Since this time
GDP growth has noticeably slowed, partly due to the onset of the financial and
economic crisis to afflict the region in 1997-98, and partly due to a disconcerting, and
related, decline in foreign direct investment flows. Despite this adverse development
there has been a remarkable transformation of the economy that has seen it become
more globally oriented, as exemplified by a rapid growth of both exports and imports
and with a significant contribution to the economy from the foreign invested sector.
For Vietnam to once again re-establish high and sustainable rates of economic growth
further restructuring and reform efforts are required. In particular, achieving further
progress in establishing the institutiona l framework necessary for a market economy,
including: the enforcement of contracts; financial discipline and a hard budget
constraint on state owned enterprises; establishing the rule of law; and restructuring of
the banking sector so that it operates on commercial lines. The country will also be
required to make further progress in ownership reform, focusing upon: ensuring free
and unrestricted entry to markets for all ownership forms, and the development of a
start up private sector; encouraging foreign direct investment; allowing the private
sector a larger role in the management and ownership of currently state owned
enterprises; allowing unviable state owned assets to be liquidated and their assets put
to more productive usage; and encouraging fair competition between different
ownership forms, with the state, as a buyer, not discriminating against any form of
ownership. These should form the core of the country’s competition policy.
This paper focuses upon the need for competition policy to encourage the nurturing,
growth and development, specifically, of private sector small and medium enterprises
(SMEs). Private entrepreneurship and enterprise reform can play a crucial role in the
reform of the Vietnamese economy. There is a recognition that a dyna mic non-state
manufacturing sector in particular is a precondition for attaining the twin objectives of
(1) restructuring and slimming state enterprises and (2) expanding non- farm
employment and income opportunities. In particular, the ability to nurture and
encourage the development of SMEs is of crucial importance not only in terms of
creating employment, but also as a means of achieving sustainable economic
development, a more efficient allocation of resources along the lines of the country’s
comparative advantage, that is labour intensive manufactured goods, expanded
exports, a more equal distribution of incomes, and is essential for rural and regional
development.
It has been increasingly recognised by regional economies in the wake of the financial
and economic crisis that there needs to be a change in emphasis for industry policy.
Industry restructuring, with a greater focus upon the development of SMEs has
occurred. Unless Vietnam is similarly able to restructure its economy, with an
emphasis on the development of SMEs, it will find itself in a relatively weaker
competitive position, vis a vis its regional neighbours, to capitalise on the recovery in
the region as it gathers pace.
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 conducts a review of Vietnam’s recent
economic performance and the contribution of the private sector to this. Section 3
provides a profile of Vietnam’s SMEs. Section 4 identifies strategies for the
promotion of the SME sector and for the development of the private sector in general.
Section 5 discusses the important role of the Government and the key areas for the
support and promotion of SMEs. Section 6 briefly identifies the core ingredients of an
effective competition policy. Finally, section 7 provides a summary of the major
conclusions from this paper.
2.

2.1

Vietnam’s recent economic performance and the contribution of the private
sector
Vietnam’s recent economic performance

During the period of the 1990s Vietnam was one of the fastest growing economies in
the world, achieving an annual average GDP growth rate of 7.4 percent. This
contributed to a rapid improvement in GDP per capita (see Figure 1). During this
period of rapid economic growth there was a noticeable change in the structure of the
economy, with the contribution of the agriculture sector to GDP declining from 40.6
percent in 1990 to 23.8 percent in 1999, the GDP share of the industry sector
increasing from 22.4 percent in 1990 to 34.3 percent by 1999, and the share of the
services sector increasing from 36.9 percent of GDP in 1990 to 41.9 percent in 1999
(see Figure 2). Such a structural transformation is a typical and nearly universal
feature accompanying economic development (see for example Chenery and Syrquin
(1975)).
On further analysis it can be found that this rapid rate of economic growth was led by
the industrial sector. Table 1, taken from Belser (2000), shows that the average annual
growth of GDP over the high growth rate period 1993-97 was an impressive 8.9
percent. The major sector contributing to this growth was the industrial sector, where
value added increased at an average annual rate of 13.4 percent. The services sector
also grew impressively at 9.4 percent a year during this period, while the agriculture
sector lagged behind with an average annual increase of 4.3 percent. This accounts for
the share of industry and services in GDP increasing relative to that of agriculture.
The period of the 1990s has seen a rise in the importance of both the non-state sector
and the foreign invested sector in indus trial production (see Figure 3). In 1990 the
state sector contributed almost 68 percent of industrial production, falling to just over
50 percent by 1995. However in 1999 there was a further decline in its contribution to
industrial production, down to jus t under 44 percent. Therefore over half of industrial
production in 1999 was from the private domestic and foreign sectors, with the
contribution of the latter, in particular, worthy of note.
The rapid growth of the industrial sector has contributed to an expansion in industrial
employment. Cross-country evidence provided by Gillis et al. (1987) indicates that
over the period 1965 to 1983 developing countries experienced on average a growth
elasticity of employment in industry of around 0.6. That is, indus trial employment
expanded at around 60 percent of the rate of industrial growth. In the case of Vietnam,
however, industrial growth has had only a moderate impact on employment. As
indicated by Tables 2 and 3 the growth rate of industrial employment in Vie tnam
between 1992/93 to 1997/98 was 4 percent per year. While respectable, this represents
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less than 30 percent of the rate of industrial output growth. Consequently, despite the
rapid growth of the industrial sector the share of industrial employment in total
employment has only increased from 11.8 percent to 13.1 percent. Interestingly, when
construction is excluded from the Industry sector, the record is even worse. Hence a
key issue for policy makers in Vietnam is how best to benefit in terms of employment
growth in the context of rapid growth in the industrial sector. In this regard the
contribution of the private sector and SMEs will be of particular importance.
Table 1.

Total
Agriculture
Industry
Industry less
construction
Services

Industrialisation of Vietnam

Average annual real
GDP growth during
1993-97 (%)
8.9
4.3
13.4
13.1

Estimated share in
total output in 1992
(%)
100
31.6
27.3
20.7

Share in total output
1997 (%)

9.4

41.1

41.7

100
25.2
33.1
24.7

Source: Belser (2000), p.2

There are a number of reasons to explain this sluggish growth of employment, and
this can be identified with the aid of Table 4. This shows that in industry the state and
the domestic non-state sectors grew rapidly over the period 1995-98. However, it is
clear that the state sector dominates the domestic non-state sector, more specifically
the private sector. In 1998 the state sector’s contribution to industrial value added was
more than twice that of the domestic private sector. State enterprises therefore
contributed substantially to the expansion of industrial production, amounting to 37.2
percent of Vietnam’s total industrial growth between 1995 and 1998. This compared
to only 16.2 percent for domestic private companies. Foreign investment, however,
was the most important single contributor to expanded industrial production.
By comparison to its contribution to industrial production the state sector’s
contribution to industrial employment is considerably less. State sector industrial
employment was less than 25 percent of total employment in this sector. The domestic
non-state sector, by contrast, although contributing only 22 percent of industrial
output employed more than 64 percent of industrial workers. A large proportion of
these workers were in household enterprises. Of particular interest is the employment
contribution of the registered private and mixed companies. Although contributing
only 7.9 percent of industrial GDP in 1998 they employed more workers than that of
the SOEs.
Vietnam’s slow employment growth in the industrial sector, therefore, arises from the
state sector’s strong growth but low labour intensity, and the private sector’s still
relatively small size. This poor employment performance can therefore be partially
explained as a by product of the transition period to a market economy, in which the
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Figure 4.

Private Registered Small and Medium Firms

24 131
1 672

Construction

3 698

Other services

5 122

Industry

10 859
802
1 681

Trade
13 639

4 392
3 894
1994

1997

Source: General Office of Statistics
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Table 2.
1992-93
(million)

Industrial employment growth
1997-98
(million)

Absolute
increase
1992-93 to
1997-98
(million)
3.5

Total
36.8
40.3
employment
Agriculture 26.2
26.8
0.6
Industry
4.3
5.3
1.0
Industry
3.8
4.3
0.5
less
construction
Services
6.3
8.2
1.9
Note: Employment data is for people between 15 and 65.
Source: Vietnam Living Standard Survey, 1 and 2
Table 3.

% increase
per year
1992-93 to
1997-98
1.8

Incremental
employment
distribution
1992-93 to
1997-98
100

0.4
4.0
2.6

16.7
27.0
14.8

5.6

56.3

Employment by sector

Share in total labour
force

Agriculture

1992-93 (%)
71.2

Share in total
labour force
1997-98 (%)
66.4

Industry

11.8

13.1

+1.3

Industry and
construction
Services

10.3

10.7

+0.4

17.0

20.5

+3.4

% Change from

1992-93 to 1997-98
-4.7

Source: Vietnam Living Standard Surveys, 1 and 2.
Table 4.

State sector
Foreign
investment
Domestic non
state sector
Of which:
private and
mixed
collective
households

Contribution to industrial production and employment by sector
Industrial
production
growth (%)
1995-98
10.2
22.7

Share in industrial
production growth
(%) 1995-98

Share in industrial
GDP (%) 1998

Share in industrial
employment
1997-98 (%)

37.2
46.5

46.2
31.8

24.2
11.5

9.2

16.2

22.0

64.3

21.6

11.1

7.9

25.2

8.7
4.0

0.3
4.7

0.6
13.5

1.3
37.8

Sources: General Statistical Office and Vietnam Living Standard Survey, 2
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growth of private enterprises is rapid but overall contribution is small as a result of
starting from a much lower base. Also, state enterprises, which tend to be
concentrated in import substituting activities and are sheltered from both foreign and
domestic competition, typically draw capital and other resources away from the
private sector. This could have prevented higher rates of private sector growth and
employment, and could be of concern for the attainment of longer-term growth and
employment creation.
Another important feature of Vietnam’ development process has been the increasing
significance of international trade. Table 5 indicates that between 1992 and 1999, for
example, the dollar value of imports and exports mo re than quadrupled, increasing the
share of trade in GDP from 52 percent to 58 percent. In 1997 the share of trade in
GDP reached a remarkable 86 percent, a high level by international standards. Table 6
indicates that Vietnam’s export growth was led by impressive growth in light
manufactured exports, which in real terms grew by no less than 45 percent a year and
whose share in total exports rose from 13.5 percent in 1992 to 36.7 percent in 1997.
Also remarkable is the strong rise in the value of agriculture exports, mainly reflecting
the spectacular take off in rice and coffee production. In only a few years Vietnam
turned from being a net rice importer into the world’s second largest exporter with
over 3.5 million tons in 1998.
The performance in manufacturing exports was supported by foreign investment.
Vietnam’s trade and taxation regimes now contain special provisions that allow export
oriented foreign enterprises to import duty free intermediate goods from abroad and to
enjoy preferential tax rates. In addition, many joint ventures are also exempted from
import duties on equipment goods, machine components, spare parts and transport
equipment and materials. Table 7 shows that the dollar value of exports by foreign
invested companies, about 40 percent of which stem from light manufacturing, grew
by 80 percent per year between 1994 and 1997. This raised the share of exports by
foreign invested companies from less than 4 percent in 1994 to almost 20 percent of
total exports in 1997.
Table 5.
Year
Value of exports
(million US$)

Exports, imports and the share of trade in GDP
1992
2,581

1997
9,185

1999
11,500

2,540

11,592

11,600

51.6

85.7

58.0

Value of imports

(million US$)
(Exports +
Imports)/GDP (%)

Source: General Statistical Office and UNDP.
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Table 6.

Total exports
Agriculture
Heavy industry and
minerals
Light industry
Of which:
textiles and garments
footwear

Export growth by sector

Estimated average
annual real growth
1992-97 (%)
18.8
11.1
12.3

Share in total exports in
1992 (%)

Share in total exports in
1997 (%)

100
49.5
37.0

100
35.3
28.0

45.1

13.5

36.7

16.4
10.6

Source: Belser (2000), p.5

Table 7.

Total exports by foreign
companies (US$ million)
Total light industrial
exports by foreign
companies (US$ million)
Share of FDI in total
exports (%)
Share of FDI in light
industry exports (%)

FDI and its contribution to exports
1994
161.1

1997
1,790

na

728

3.9

19.5

na

21.6

Source: Belser (2000).

2.2

Contribution of the private sector to the economy

The Prime Minister in his opening speech to the National Assembly in November
1999, emphasised the importance of creating a climate conducive to private sector
development. Farmers, household micro enterprises, private SMEs and relatively
large foreign invested enterprises comprise the private sector in Vietnam. The decollectivisation of agriculture, together with the approval of the Domestic and Foreign
Investment laws in the late 1980s, as well as the Commercial Law in the early 1990s,
were extremely effective in promoting growth of the private sector from a negligible
base. The economic reforms of the 1980s were remarkably effective in galvanising the
energy of millions of Vietnamese individuals who diversified and expanded their
agricultural production rapidly, and set up many micro-household-enterprises as well
as domestic private registered SMEs. Foreign firms invested in majority foreign
owned joint ventures or in wholly foreign owned enterprises. Tapping the potential of
individual farmers’ drive and dynamism through “Doi Moi” was key to the rapid
growth and employment generation of the 1990s (see World Bank (1999)). In the
early part of the twenty first century, unleashing the potential of the private non- farm
sector, to produce and to export, is likely to be the key to restoring higher growth of
income and employment during the next decade.

9

While systematic data on the performance of the domestic private sector is limited,
what does exist suggests a significant expansion and diversification of private sector
activities in the last 10 years. Five important facts about the performance of the
private sector can be usefully highlighted.
First, the share of the private sector in total GDP in 1998 was about 50 percent, see
Table 8, approximately the same share as in 1993. Hence the domestic private sector’s
share of GDP remained stagnant during this period. During the period 1995-98 the
domestic private sector, despite its many constraints, grew at 9 percent a year, only a
percentage point lower than the growth of the state owned sector.
Second, less than half of manufacturing GDP in 1998 was produced by private firms,
but the share is increasing, with the domestic private sector dominating that share (see
Table 8). The domestic private sector, especially household enterprises, has had an
important role in manufacturing. Household micro enterprises and private SMEs
account for 28 percent of manufacturing GDP. As of 1999 there were around 600,000
micro household enterprises in manufacturing, contributing 18 percent of
manufacturing value added, and 5600 private SMEs in manufacturing accounting for
10 percent of manufacturing GDP. However, with the introduction of the Enterprise
Law in 2000 the situation was changing rapidly, especially for private registered
SMEs, with more than 10,000 new firms registered during the first nine months of
2000.
The period of the 1990s has seen a steady decline in the contribution of the state
sector towards industrial output, from around 62 percent in 1990 to 44 percent by
1999 and to just over 42 percent in 2000 (see Table 9). While the domestic private
(non-state) share has actually declined during this period the foreign invested
enterprises’ share has increased considerably. Most of this was due to very rapid
growth of foreign invested enterprises in the oil and gas sector as well as in
manufacturing. Household enterprise growth stagnated after the first half of the 1990s
as the environment for domestic private enterprises was not sufficiently favourable to
promote their rapid growth. Thus foreign invested enterprises now have a much
bigger share of total private industrial output than was the case in 1990.
Table 8.

State sector
State owned enterprises
Private sector
Foreign invested sector
Domestic private sector
Of which:
Household
enterprises/farmers
Private SMEs

Private sector’s share in 1998 GDP (percent)
Total GDP
49
na
51
10
41

Manufacturing GDP
54
na
46
18
28

34

18

7

10

Source: General Statistical Office, Statistical Yearbook.
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Table 9.

Industrial output: growth and share by sector, 1990-2000

Total industrial growth (%)

1990

1995

1999p

2000e

3.2

13.8

10.4

15.5

61.7

50.3

43.5

42.2

29.5

24.6

21.8

22.7

8.8

25.1

34.7

35.2

Percent of industrial output
State owned enterprises
Domestic private (non state) sector
Foreign invested
p – preliminary figure

e - estimate
Source: General Statistical Office, Yearbook.
Third the domestic private sector is considerably more labour intensive in comparison
to the state sector and the foreign invested sector. Referring to Table 4 again, it can be
seen that in 1998 the state sector contributed 46 percent to industrial production but
employed only 24 percent of the industrial workforce. The foreign invested sector
contributed 32 percent of industrial production but employed only 11.5 percent of the
industrial workforce. By contrast the domestic non state-sector, household enterprises
and private SMEs, contributed only 22 percent of industrial production but employed
64 percent of the industrial workforce. The relatively large share of the private sector
in employment and in labour intensive exports indicates that it has been
outperforming other enterprises in exploiting Vietnam’s comparative advantage in
labour intensive production. Indeed, private sector development in Vietnam, through
its effect on growth and employment, can have a significant impact on poverty
reduction.
Fourthly, private SMEs in manufacturing, especially the larger ones, are highly export
oriented. In Vietnam there are around 457 private manufacturers with more than 100
full time workers (see MPFD (1999)) that operate mainly in labour intensive sectors
like garments, footwear, plastic products, seafood and so on (see Table 10). On
average these SMEs export around three-quarters of their production, and
consequently have a greater export orientation than SOEs. By comparison foreign
invested enterprises export only around a half of their output.
Finally, private foreign invested enterprises are playing an increasingly important role
in the economy, accounting for about a fifth of manufacturing output and employing
300,000 workers in 1998. There has been a slight trend away from joint ventures with
state enterprises and an increase in wholly foreign owned investments. A large share
of foreign investment in industry is in the production of import competing goods in
capital- intensive sectors. This is a reflection of the incentives offered to foreign
investors in the form of protection to these sectors. In particular, import- licensing
restrictions with unlimited protection have encouraged over investment for the
domestic market, at the cost of export markets. This structure of foreign investment
partially reflects Vietnam’s high barriers to heavy industrial imports that not only
11

protect state enterprises but also attracts foreign investors into import substituting and
capital- intensive activities, often with SOEs. This form of foreign investment is
generally inefficient. It creates local monopolies and raises the price of products
relative to those that would have prevailed under free imports. Thus, although foreign
investment has boosted local production it has done little to create employment.
Improving the climate for export oriented foreign investors would certainly assist
Vietnam towards more labour intensive export led growth in line with its comparative
advantage.
Table 10.

Private registered manufacturers – export orientation

Number of firms

Garments and textiles
Leather products
Rubber and plastic products
Food and beverages (incl. seafood)
Wood products
Other non- metallic products
Basic metals
Chemical products
Others
Total

159
34
22
71
65
39
9
9
49
457

Exports/Output (%)
(unweighted average)
80.5
85.0
75.0
63.2
75.1
73.2
na
20.0
74.4
75.3

Source: Mekong Project Development Facility (1999)
The adoption of the 1987 Law on Foreign Investment and subsequent amendment
established an “open door” policy for investors and increasingly simplified investment
procedures. This gradual improvement in the investment climate led to a large
increase in foreign capital inflows, mainly from Asian countries. During the period
1993-97 the inflow of disbursed foreign investment increased by almost 46 percent
per annum (in terms of current US dollars), reaching nearly US$2.1 billion during
1997. Most of this foreign investment was capital intensive. Although the share of
FDI going to light industry has increased in recent years, most investment entered oil
related production, heavy industry or real estate. By the end of 1998 less than 13
percent of the total stock of FDI was in the labour intensive light industrial sector,
where about 80 percent of production is exported (according to information from the
Ministry of Planning and Investment). This indicates that the amount of export
oriented and labour intensive foreign investment attracted by Vietnam’s high human
capital and low labour costs has been relatively small. It is therefore not surprising
that foreign investment, while accounting for 31.8 percent of industrial production in
1998, and half of industrial growth over the period 1995-98, employed only 11.5
percent of all industry workers in 1997/98.
Despite a number of favourable developments the private sector remains more
constrained in Vietnam than in other countries in the region, including China. The
private sector continues to face various unnecessary restrictions on entry arising from
the remaining business license requirements, whose modification and rationalisation
are still needed. Access to and transactions in land use rights remain difficult despite
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recent changes in land law and security regulations. New institutional arrangements
like registries, and procedures for selling foreclosed land use rights are not in place.
Access to capital and credit is also more difficult for private SMEs in part because
banks are in dire financial straits, and in part because lending to SOEs is viewed more
favourably than lending to the private sector. But improving the climate for day to day
operations of private investors - making interactions with the bureaucracy easier- will
necessitate deep seated behavioural changes in the way private activity is perceived
by the civil service, the dominant state owned commercial banks, and, most
importantly, by the political leadership.
3.

Vietnam’s SMEs - a profile

The Vietnamese economy is characterised by a large number of small and medium
sized enterprises with little capital, total SME capital accounts for just 20 percent of
the total business capital value of all enterprises, and a small number of state-owned
enterprises holding most of the capital of the whole country1 . More than half of all
SMEs are not owned by the state and are therefore, officially at least, private. In
practice many companies that appear to be private are really not. “So dominant is the
state in Vietnam that the only way to survive is through a network of political
patronage” (The Economist (1997), p.46). Before 1988 Vietnam had no private
enterprises, “apart from family firms, which were politically above suspicion if only
because, at least officially, they did not employ any wage labour” (Wolff (1999), p.
72). There were, however, some enterprises that were run virtually along marketeconomy lines, particularly in the south of the country. Currently, the most important
organisational form of private enterprise is still the household firm, employing an
average of 3 employees each (Wolff (1999), p.73) 2 . The next largest element of what
Wolff calls the semi-formal private sector, are the industrial co-operatives and quasico-operative ‘production groups’ (Wolff (1999)). The number of non-state enterprises
has increased dramatically recently 3 and the number of enterprises in the collective
and state sectors has tended to decrease. The number of private enterprises, excluding
business households or groups working below the limit of legal capital, has been
increasing most quickly. Only 5.7 percent of non-state enterprises were established
before 1990 4 .
3.1

The Number and Structure of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises

In Vietnam, SMEs are officially defined by the Government as enterprises with
chartered capital of under VND5 5 billion (or US$360,000) and fewer than 200 staff6 .
In 1998 there were more than 30,000 registered enterprises in Vietnam, including
more than 23,000 non-state enterprises. Of these registered firms, approximately
22,000 were SMEs. SMEs in Vietnam account for 87.7 percent of the number of State
firms, 30 percent of joint ventures, and 96 percent of total private firms in Vietnam.
(Central Institute for Economic Manage ment (CIEM), (1998)).
1

Vietnam had approximately 5300 SOEs in 2000.
Ironically, the Government of Vietnam does not consider family-owned businesses to be private
companies (Vietnam News Agency, 2000).
3
The size of registered capital of these newly established enterprises has been decreasing.
4
General Statistical Office, 1996.
5
Vietnamese Dong.
6
Ministry of Planning and Investment, 1998.
2
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If we classify SMEs by their amount of investment capital (those enterprises with
investment capital below VND 5 billion) and by their number of employees (less than
200), then around 90 percent of the total number of enterprises in Vietnam are
classified as small or medium sized. Despite making up the preponderance of
Vietnamese enterprises the capital value of these SMEs accounts for only 20 percent
of the total business capital value of all enterprises7 . The considerable capital va lue of
the SOEs, particularly the large ones, accounts for this, in addition to the fact that the
capital value of the non-state SMEs account for only just over half (52 percent ) of the
total capital value of non-state enterprises.
Figure 4 indicates the growth in number of private registered SMEs over the period
1994-97. In 1994 there were 10,859 privately registered SMEs of which most were in
the industry sector (4,392) and trade sector (3,894). While overall industrial growth
has outstripped service sector growth, growth in the number of private SMEs has been
far higher in services than industry. This reflects the bias in industrial growth in
favour of capital intensive and large sized enterprises. Trading SMEs more than
tripled in number between 1994 and 1997 (Figure 4)) while those in construction and
other services more than doubled. The faster growth of service SMEs is largely
because this sector is less dominated by state enterprises and thus experiences fewer
restrictions on private participation. In 1997 56.5 percent of all SMEs were in trade
and repairing services; 21.2 percent were in the industry sector; 6.9 percent were in
the construction sector; and the remaining 15.3 percent in other services. Most (90
percent) of the more than 5,122 SME firms in industry in 1997 were in four subsectors: food and beverages (56 percent); garments and shoes (9 percent); metals and
metal products (17 percent) and wood and paper products (11 percent). SMEs are
typically well represented in sectors in which size and scale are not significant cost
advantages. Such activities offer the greatest potential for future expansion of private
SMEs (World Bank. 1998, p. 30).
The contribution of non-state SMEs under a number of categories for various
economic sectors in 1997 is contained in Table 11 and that for the economy as a
whole in Table 12.
Table 11
Contribution of Non-State SMEs in the main economic sectors 1997 (%)
Sector
Fisheries
Processing industry
Construction
Trade
Service & hospitality

Capital

Labour

55
15
22
21
19

80
49
56
60
56

Source: General Statistical Office, 1998

7

General Statistical Office, 1996.
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Turnover Tax payments
57
22
33
42
43

87
24
19
18
63

Table 12
Contribution of Non-State SMEs in the economy, 1998 (%)

Capital
10.2

Labour
47

Turnover

Tax payments

35

16

Source: Ministry of Planning and Investment, 1999

3.2

Contribution to GDP and production

In Vietnam there are almost no figures available for the contribution of SMEs to the
economy. The following is an attempt to draw a general picture of the sector based on
data available for economic inputs. In 1995 the share of “value added” produced by
the non-state sector to GDP was 65 percent. The contribution of non-state enterprises,
including SMEs, to GDP was approximately 36.6 percent. The share of capital value
of SMEs in the total business capital value of all non-state enterprises was
approximately 52 percent 8 . It is therefore possible to assume that the proportion that
SMEs provided of the total value added produced by non-state enterprises was also 52
percent, that is 19 percent of GDP. The share of value added produced by SOEs as a
whole is equal to 25 percent of GDP 9 . Assuming that the value added by state SMEs
is equal to one fifth of this then the contribution of state SMEs to value added is equal
to approximately 5 percent of GDP. Thus, the share of value added produced by all
SMEs in the country, in all economic sectors, is estimated to be approximately equal
to 24 percent of GDP (see Table 13). This corresponds with the figure of 25 percent of
GDP quoted by the World Bank (2001) p.49, suggesting that the proportion of GDP
contributed by all SMEs has not changed by much during the latter half of the 1990s.
Table 13
Contribution of Vietnamese SMEs to GDP 1995
No. Vietnamese SMEs by Ownership
1
Non-state SMEs
2
State-owned SMEs
TOTAL

Percentage of GDP
19 %
5%
24 %

Sources: Ministry of Planning and Investment, 1998

Tables 4 and 9 indicate that the state sector dominated the industrial sector during the
period of the 1990s. However by 2000 its contribut ion had fallen to 42 percent of
industrial production, and foreign invested enterprises, including joint ventures with
SOEs, contributed a further 35 percent of industrial production. The domestic nonstate sector contributed the remaining 23 percent of industrial production, with the
bulk of this being produced by household micro-enterprises. While private registered
companies (SMEs), overall, contributed a very small proportion of industrial output,
only about 2.4 percent of industrial production in 1997 (Table 14), they were very
important in the production of key export items including that of garments and
textiles. However, the share contributed by all SMEs (including state SMEs, private
local SMEs and those with foreign investment) to the total industrial gross output has
been estimated by one source to be equal to 31 percent 10 . However, compared with
8

Ministry of Planning and Investment, 1998.
General Statistical Office, 1998.
10
Central Institute for Economic Management, 1998.
9
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other countries in the region, where SMEs contribute on average 50-60 percent of
GDP 11 , the performance of Vietnamese SMEs remains modest.
Table 14
Distribution of Industrial Output by Ownership (%), 1997 Figures
Total Industry
51.4
24.4
24.2

State Owned Enterprises
Foreign Invested Enterprises¹
Non-State
Of which:
Private companies²

2.4

Garments
36.0
15.0
49.0

Textiles
60.0
16.0
24.0

18.0

14.0

Note:

¹ Includes 100 percent foreign-owned companies and joint ventures with SOEs
² Private registered enterprises and others not in partnership with SOEs
Source: World Bank (1998), Table 2.4, p. 30.

3.5

Contribution to industrial employment

The non-state sector contributes significantly to employment. As indicated in Table 4
the non-state sector contributed 76 percent of industrial employment in 1997-98, with
the domestic private sector contributing 64 per cent of total industrial employment.
Private SMEs contributed 27 percent and household enterprises contributed 37
percent of total industrial employment in 1997/98 (see Table 15). The World Bank
((2001), p. 49) has asserted that total SMEs fo r all sectors contribute 50 percent of
total labour employment.
Table 15
Industrial employment by sector (%), 1997-98
Ownership
State sector
Foreign invested
Private SMEs
Household enterprises

% of workforce
24
12
27
37

Sources: GSO: Vietnam Living Standard Survey 2, 1999

3.6

Contribution to international trade

As identified previously, Vietnam has made considerable advances in increasing the
openness of its economy. Between 1991 and 1995 private firms were allowed to
engage in foreign trade by obtaining a license, tariff exemptions were introduced for
imported inputs used in the production of exports, licensing procedures were
simplified, an inter bank foreign exchange market was introduced, and quotas on
exports were removed except for rice. Vietnam signalled its intention to integrate with
the region by joining ASEAN in 1995, and is now also seeking membership of the
WTO. Since 1998 the trade regime has been opened up further. The most significant
measure was the freeing up of trading rights for firms registered in Vietnam. These
firms were allowed, for the first time, to export and import goods directly without a
license 12 . This newly provided right for domestic firms encouraged significant
11
12

Ministry of Planning and Investment, 1999.
For imports: registered domestic firms could only import products that were specified in their
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participation of private firms in foreign trade. Domestic private SMEs' share of non
oil exports rose from 12 percent in 1997 to 22 percent in mid 2000, Their share of
imports increased from 4 percent to 16 percent over the same period (see Table 16).
There is therefore considerable potential for an expansion of exports by SMEs,
particularly given that they primarily produce labour intensive products that are in line
with the country’s comparative advantage.
Table 16

State owned enterprises
Foreign invested
enterprises
Domestic private SMEs
Total

Shares in non oil exports and total imports
Non oil exports
1997
Mid-2000
65
46
23
32

Total Imports
1997
Mid-2000
68
57
28
27

12
100

4
100

22
100

16
100

Source: Ministry of Trade
3.7

Distribution of SMEs by location

According to Ministry of Planning and Investment calculations, see Table 17, more
than 55 percent of the total number of SMEs are located in the Southeast and the
Mekong River Delta. The figures for the Red River Delta and the North Central Coast
are 18.1 percent and 10.1 percent, respectively. This suggests that there is
considerable scope for an expansion of SMEs in the north of the country, where in the
past SOEs have traditionally dominated.
Table 17
Distribution of SMEs by Region
Region
1 Southeast Coast & Mekong River Delta
2 Red River Delta
3 North Central Coast
4 Other Regions
TOTAL

Percentage
55.0%
18.1%
10.1%
16.8%
100.0%

Source: Ministry of Planning and Investment, 1998

4.

SME promotion and private sector development

4.1

Overview

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam has drafted a SocioEconomic Development Strategy (SEDS) 2001-2010 that is “aimed at accelerating
industrialisation and modernisation in the socialist orientation and creating a
foundation for Vietnam to become an industrialised country by 2020” 13 . This
registration license, and foreign invested firms could not do so until the recent revision to the Foreign
Investment Law had eased those restrictions somewhat.
13
Central Committee of the Communist Party “Socio-Economic Development Strategy 2001-2010
(draft) p.1.
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envisages that GDP will double from 2000 to 2010 14 . Vietnam in 2000 faced serious
challenges in employment generation with unemployment figures at more than 7
percent, underemployment around 30 percent and an expected growth of the
workforce of 11 million people over the next 10 years. Since unemployment and
underemployment are the major factors contributing to poverty, the creation of new
jobs, and particularly in the rural sector, will be crucial for the reduction of poverty.
To accomplish these aims the SEDS gives particular emphasis to SMEs and private
enterprises, especially given their ability to generate employment and opportunities
for the poor. In 2000 overall SMEs, both state and private, generated approximately a
quarter of GDP, employed around 50 percent of the Vietnamese labour force and were
the fastest growing type of enterprise in terms of numbers (see World Bank (2001), p.
49). A flourishing private sector and a growing number of SMEs have the potential to:
generate new jobs as well as absorb labour made redundant by the ongoing reform of
the SOEs; provide the engine for economic growth; contribute to export growth; and
play a vital role in the modernisation and industrialisation of Vietnam. Therefore the
government realises that it will be essential, to achieve the targets set under the SEDS,
to support the further development of the private sector and SMEs.
Meeting the draft strategy’s investment targets will require total domestic private
investment having to rise to 11-13 percent of GDP. This is unlikely to occur without a
significant improvement in the climate for the private sector, and for SMEs in
particular. The climate for the private sector, however, still remains grudging rather
than supportive. This contrasts markedly with China where the private sector has been
recognised openly as a key partner in the country’s development 15 . Despite this there
are indications that the climate is improving. In mid 1998 the Law on Promotion of
Domestic Investment was revised providing new incentives for the domestic private
sector. This was followed by the approval and implementation of the Enterprise Law
in 1999 and 2000. Together with the elimination of more than 100 different business
licenses that restricted entry in different sectors, ongoing implementation of the Law
is improving the policy environment for domestic private SMEs significantly. The
Enterprise Law 2000 substantially simplified business start up and led to the
registration of more than 10,000 additional domestic firms in the first nine months of
2000. However, domestic private registered firms (private SMEs) still number only
around 30,000 and produce less than 10 percent of GDP. Creating a level playing field
for the private sector will require a shift in the social and administrative culture from
one of reluctance and control towards one of active support and encouragement. The
private sector will also benefit from the introduction of a transparent and predictable
regulatory framework, where discretionary actions on the part of officials are
minimised.
In addition three recent government policies have gone some way to reducing the
restrictions on private SMEs. First, firms are allowed to export directly. This will help
small firms most of all as they were least able to bear the additional transactions costs
of previous restrictions. Second, requirements to import through state enterprises, to
satisfy stipulated conditions of capital and qualified personnel needed for being
registered as an importer, have been removed. Third, foreign investors are now
14

Central Committee of the Communist Party “Socio-Economic Development Strategy 2001-2010
(draft) p.6.
15
See for example Harvie (2001).
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allowed to own thirty percent of shares in existing domestic enterprises, permitting
private firms to seek foreign partners.
More needs to be done in the area of finance and access to credit for SMEs,
particularly for efficient enterprises in rural industry. So far, farmers, SOEs and
private foreign firms have driven growth. Private small and medium enterprises have
played a negligible role, especially in industry. But private SMEs have been the most
efficient users of resources in other countries of the region and key to employment
creation. They need to be encouraged in Vietnam. A vigorous private SME sector will
need more freedom to operate and better services from a vigorous and modern
banking sector, neither of which Vietnam has at present. A precondition for
promoting such entrepreneurship will be to introduce reforms to reorient the country’s
banks towards the needs of private SMEs and to restructure, equitise and liquidate
SOEs, to improve their efficiency. A more open trade regime and less import
protection for heavy industry will mean more investment in labour intensive sectors
and exports (garments, footwear, travel goods, processed agricultural products,
tourism), stimulating rural industry and agriculture. While registered private firms can
export or import more easily, registration of private businesses, a prerequisite for
trading, still remains difficult.
The most cost effective prospect for generating off farm employment is through
promoting SMEs (i.e. registered private companies with 50-300 employees) Each job
generated in an SME is estimated to require a capital investment of about US$800
(VND 11 million, in book value). In contrast, one job created in an SOE requires
approximately US$18,000 (VND 240 million). Empirical evidence from other
countries also indicates that SMEs are more efficient users of capital under most
conditions 16 .
During the early period of reform in the late 1980s agricultural growth, made possible
by allowing farmers greater decision making freedom, was the main engine for
Vietnam’s initial surge of growth. Eliminating the existing restrictions on SMEs has
the potential to result in a second round of growth by boosting labour intensive
manufactures and processed agricultural exports, thereby protecting rural areas from
the current slowdown. So far private SMEs (i.e. registered corporate firms) have
played a minor role in industrial production, contributing only two percent of
industrial output, and have grown very slowly. Household enterprises play a much
larger role. This contrasts sharply with the experiences of its rapidly developing
regional neighbours.
4.2

Promoting Vietnam’s SMEs

Despite an improvement in the private sector business environment its growth and
development still remains more constrained in Vietnam than in other countries of the
region, including China. For example, the private sector continues to face various
unnecessary restrictions on entry arising from remaining business license
requirements, whose modification and rationalisation are still needed. Access to and
transactions in land use rights remain difficult despite changes in land law and
security regulations. New institutional arrangements like registries, and procedures for
selling foreclosed land use rights are not in place. Access to capital and credit is also
16
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more difficult for private SMEs in part because banks are in dire financial straits and
in part because lending to SOEs is viewed more favourably than lending to the private
sector. But improving the climate for day-to-day operations of private investors by
making interactions with the bureaucracy easier, will necessitate deep-seated
behavioural changes in the way private activity is perceived by the civil service, the
dominant state owned commercial banks, and, most importantly, by the political
leadership.
According to a recent survey by the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry
(VCCI (1999)), the main difficulties encountered by SMEs in Vietnam are:
•
•
•
•
•

The majority (80 percent) lack capital for production and trade.
Most have obsolete equipment and machinery.
They lack adequate physical and human resources.
They lack current information on technical, market and legal issues.
They lack support from the state, especially in technology transfer, credit
guarantees and loans.

In this section four of these issues are given particular focus: access to finance; access
to technology and use of information technology; access to market information; and
human capital deficiencies. Each of these is now briefly discussed in turn.
4.2.1

Access to finance

Government policies on mobilising financial resources have been implemented
through taxation, interest-rate management, and investment promotion strategies.
Domestic production did develop rapidly in the first half of the 1990s as did domestic
savings and gross investments. From 1991-1995 domestic private investment (mainly
by SMEs) accounted for 30 percent of total gross investment (approximately equal to
US$6 billion). The remainder of the capital for enterprises was mobilised from formal
domestic and international institutions.
Despite the increase in investment nearly all (80 percent) of Vietnamese SMEs lack
capital for production or business, according to official statistics (Ministry of Planning
and Investment, (1999)). According to a survey of SMEs conducted in 1999 by the
Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI): 55 percent of enterprises had
difficulty in obtaining capital; 67.5 percent of enterprises had to borrow from relatives
and friends; 25 percent of enterprises had to deliver materials in advance; only 42.5
percent of enterprises borrowed from the banks; and 20 percent of enterprises
borrowed from other financial organisations (VCCI (1999)).
Other surveys of SMEs by government management agencies and other organisations
give similar results. These surveys also pointed out that the share of bank loans
allocated to the non-state enterprises has tended to increase, but not in accord with
their number and their contribution to GDP. For instance, bank loans to these
enterprises, as a proportion of total loans, were: 10.3 percent in 1990, 18.2 percent in
1992, 33.1 percent in 1993, and 37.1 percent in 1994 and 50 percent in 199517 .
However, this has not satisfied the demand for credit by non-state enterprises. The
17
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financial system can satisfy only 25.6 percent of the credit demand by the non-state
enterprises. According to CIEM, in 1995, among 407 SMEs surveyed, 316 had to
borrow from informal financial sources.
Difficulty in accessing financial resources by SMEs has partly resulted from the
obstacles created by some of the policies and regulations on capital mobilisation. The
effect of these policies has been as follows. First, the majority of external resources,
such as Foreign Direct Investment and Official Development Assistance, have been
allocated to the state sector. Second, there are still irrational regulations that seriously
hamper the capital mobilisation of SMEs. For example, the regulations on short-term
credit issued by the State Bank give preferential treatment to the state-owned
enterprises, which enjoy cheaper financing in comparison to their counterparts in the
private sector. Compulsory insurance is also unreasonably required for those assets
financed by bank loans, even when such loans had not yet been given by the banks
and when the ownership documents related to the assets are not available. Collateral
for bank loans is required for non-state enterprises while it is not for SOEs. There is
still no guidance document available on collateral procedures. According to Decision
198/NH on 16 September 1994 by the State Bank and Decision 217 on 17 August
1996, the maximum bank loan is defined to be equal to 70 percent of the value of the
collateral written in the loan contract. However, in practice, enterprises are given
loans equal to less than 50 percent of collateral, regardless of the fact that the asset
values determined by the banks are usually different from the actual values. Third,
there are no special financial institutions for SMEs, except for a number of foreign
funds such as the SME Development Fund, which operates through the existing
commercial banks, and the Mekong Project Development Facility (MPDF) that
mainly provides technical assistance for private sector SMEs.
4.2.2

Access to technology and use of information technology

Technology and equipment in SMEs
A draft development strategy for SMEs prepared by the Ministry of Planning and
Investment (MPI, 1999) indicated that their technology level, as well as the nature of
their equipment and machinery, was in poor shape. Moreover, the rate of renovation is
too low, approximately at the level of 10 percent of annual investment. The strategy
document proposed, in order to improve conditions for the development of
technology, that:
•
•
•

Competition should be created to encourage enterprises to adopt new technology
and renovate existing technology;
The economy should be open to access and exchange information;
Enterprises should be encour aged to improve their capacity to apply new
technology.

Presently, the majority of Vietnamese enterprises, especially SMEs, are using obsolete
technology that is perhaps 3 or 4 generations behind the world's average level. Their
technological and technical capacity is limited, and the capital level per employee is
low (only 3 percent of the level in the large industrial enterprises) 18 .

18
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In a recent survey by the Central Institute for Economic Management, specialists in
government organisations and other SME support institutions recognised that the
technology level in SMEs is obsolete, that technology management skills are poor,
and that product quality is low. At the same time the government has not provided
supporting policies for technological advance. Amo ng 40 enterprises surveyed only 2
had been able to get any technological support19 . Policies that support the
enhancement of technology for SMEs have many weaknesses. These are:
•
•
•
•
•

There are no policies specific to SMEs (that is specific policies on training and
improving the skills in management, technology, etc.).
No research and development organisation has been created specifically for
SMEs.
The specialised organisations in science, technology, and training that exist are not
strong enough to provide the supporting and consulting services required for
SMEs;
The existing promotion centres were established mainly to meet the requirements
of international assistance projects rather than to satisfy the need to support SMEs.
There is still no master plan or national strategy for the development of SMEs in
the country.

Access to information technology - electronic commerce
Electronic commerce has yet to be systematically developed in Vietnam. In the
country as a whole there are only four Internet Service Providers (ISPs), and fewer
than 100 companies with their own registered websites. The Internet is still a luxury to
most people, with high service charges (2 US cents for each minute on-line) and
extremely limited banking infrastructure support for e-commerce.
As in many other countries e-commerce could play a vital role in Vietnam in the
future. Currently however, especially in rural areas, lack of proper
telecommunications, hardware and software, training, human skills and access to
appropriate technology cons titute major obstacles to the development of e-commerce
especially for SMEs. Today only 72,000 Internet connections are registered in
Vietnam. Major effort is required by the government to improve the current situation.
4.2.3

Availability of Information

One of the first steps in entering the export business is to get adequate and reliable
information on market opportunities. This is a major difficulty for many SMEs. Most
obtain information through the media or by personal contacts and not through formal
channels. These personal contacts could be relatives or friends living overseas, or
acquaintances made at trade fairs, conferences or on private trips. Only the more
dynamic SMEs tend to contact formal organisations like the SME Club, the Chamber
of Commerce and Industry and the various Trade Associations for such information.
However, the average SME can neither digest nor effectively use the large quantity of
statistical data and general information from the above sources, even if they manage
to obtain it. The lack of reliable and useful market information often leads to a
situation where local firms export their products with lower prices than the
competition or miss out on good business opportunities.
19
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The availability of specific information regarding ne w technology has been improved
with the opening of technology centres such as the Technology Presentation House
(TPH) in Ho Chi Minh City. These centres have been established with the aim of
introducing new technologies and advanced products - both local and international that can be implemented in Vietnam.
4.2.4

Human capital - Skills and Qualifications

The skills of employees in SMEs do not meet desirable standards according to the
Vietnamese government, because the majority of them, especially in small businesses,
have not received any training while their educational level is low. Only about 5
percent 20 of employees in the non-state sector have a university degree. The majority
of the owners of non-state enterprises established in recent years have also not
received any training, but they have a higher level of general education. Nevertheless,
only 31.2 percent of the owners of non-state enterprises have a university or higher
degree 21 , and 51.8 percent of proprietors have a management qualification. The
percentage in proprietorships that have no management qualifications is 70.5 percent
and in limited liability companies 26.4 percent.
5.

Government’s role and support for SMEs

5.1

Background

Until the beginning of the 1980s in Vietnam there were only two significant
institutional forms in the economy: state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and co-operatives.
Private production and business units were allowed to operate but their scale and
scope were negligible. Economic management during this period was based on the
mechanisms of central planning. Enterprises did not have any autonomy in their
production and business process since the government controlled and distributed
resources and applied a monopoly policy on trade.
Economic reform started in 1986, but by 1988 inflation was increasing at an annual
rate of 40 percent with a large current account deficit. The events of 1989 convinced
the Vietnamese Government that it would get no further help from its previous
benefactor, the Soviet Union. Starting in that year it therefore adopted a package of
measures introducing strict structural reforms and macroeconomic stabilisation, in
line with IMF orthodoxy (Reidel and Comer (1997), pp. 195-197). The “shock
therapy” included the adoption of a policy of trade liberalisation and switching the
economy to a market price mechanism that accelerated reform. The abolition of the
majority of subsidies helped, and indeed forced, enterprises to operate within the
market mechanism. The shift to a market focus was a key element in the policy of
economic reform and contributed substantially to the development of the private
sector in Vietnam. The policy of creating a market economy through the liberalisation
of business activities relied on two factors: that market forces determine production
and business decisions, and that the valid rights of enterprises are protected by the
state (Woo (1997)). One of the essential components of economic reform is defined
in the policy for multi- sectoral development that recognises the permanent existence
20 General Statistical Office, 1996, p.97.
21 General Statistical Office, 1996.
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of a variety of forms of enterprise and provides for their equal treatment under the
law.
5.2

Government’s long-term vision

The draft Socio-Economic Development Strategy (SEDS) 2001 – 2010 of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam (SEDS), emphasises accelerating
industrialisation and modernisation of the country and creating a foundation for
Vietnam to become an industrialised country by 2020. In order to accomplish these
aims the SEDS emphasises the importance of SMEs and private enterprises. A
flourishing private sector and a growing number of SMEs would: absorb new workers
as well as labour made redundant by the ongoing reform of the SOEs; be a key engine
of economic growth; contribute to export growth; and play a vital role in the
modernisation and industrialisation of Vietnam. The role of the government in
supporting the further development of the private sector and SMEs will be essential,
and involve leveling the playing field between SOEs and private companies and
enhanc ing the business environment by: simplifying the tax system; streamlining
administrative procedures; reducing red-tape and corruption; restructuring the banking
system; and strengthening existing or, when necessary, creating additional support
institut ions. Particular focus is required for the development of SMEs in the rural
sector where non-agricultural jobs are scarce, underemployment is high, and poverty
widespread.
5.3

Achieving the long term vision

Since the change to the Constitution in 1992, recognising the right of freedom of
business and equality before the law for all sectors of economy, the government has
taken steps to develop the private sector and SMEs. Most recently the SEDS, the
PSPAP 22 and a draft Governmental Decree on SME Promotion Policies Structure
provide details of Government plans for further action in this area. These plans focus
upon the following areas: enhancing the legal environment for SMEs; strengthening
existing and/or establishing new institutions; easier access to capital; trade promotion
and export development of SME/private enterprises; and improving the image of the
private sector. These are now discussed in turn.
5.3.1

Enhancing the legal environment for SMEs

Since 1986 important achievements have been made in adopting and elaborating legal
measures and in creating the legal framework within which all types of enterprises can
operate. Up to the end of 1996, 55 laws (codes, laws and acts), 64 decrees and 251
resolutions had been promulgated 23 . However, the soundness and validity of the
fundamental reform legislation is in doubt. Significant problems are being caused by
the proliferation of legal instruments, many contradictory, which are issued at every
hierarchical level. This is due partly to a lack of experience in constructing the legal
framework and partly because of the nature of the culture and social structure and the
tensions within it. This results in an inability of the state to make any one entity
22
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accountable. The effect of which is a proliferation of state agencies with overlapping
responsibilities and opposing functions (Kornai (1990)).
Although the legal system is still not complete and has many imperfections, it has
provided a level of protection higher than before that has helped the economy to
operate on a legal basis. However, overall reforms have been slow and moderate and
have often been accompanied by arbitrary new rules. A government agency (Central
Institute for Economic Management (CIEM) (1998)) identified the following main
shortcomings:
•
•

•
•
•
•

Legal regulations are too complex, ambiguous and contradictory.
The legal environment for different types of enterprises is different and creates
unequal grounds for enterprises to be established and operated. Many policies give
priority to enterprises based on their ownership without supporting measures
being linked to the scale of enterprise (so small enterprises which are officially or
semi-officially owned receive more protection than larger ones which are not);
Frequent changes in the regulations provide an unstable legal environment;
Legal instruments are usually issued hastily, without corresponding support from
supporting legislation;
Some legal documents still lack a rational basis that causes difficulties and
restrictions for enterprises, and creates gaps which they can abuse;
Communication of the nature and implications of legal changes is still limited, and
generally enterprises, especially SMEs, have limited knowledge of the regulations.

To advance the development of SMEs Vietnam requires a rule-of- law-based
regulatory framework. The current system of vague and frequently changing
regulations and excessive bureaucracy has resulted in: increased risk and cost of doing
business; a drain on the resources and time of private entrepreneurs that would
otherwise be available for investment or for management of the business; and has
created an inhospitable business environment. Evidence from other countries shows
that bureaucratic stranglehold, exercised through bureaucratic discretion, has been a
major drag on private sector dynamism. To establish the rule of law as the basis for
government-business relationships there will also be a need for institution-building.
A transparent legal and regulatory framework for the private sector, therefore, needs
to be established, to ensure a level playing field for both SOEs and the private sector.
Three actions over the medium-term will be required to achieve this. First,
Government should continue to monitor carefully and implement effectively the
Enterprise Law (e.g. eliminating, modifying and rationalising the remaining business
licenses in other sectors) and the Domestic Investment law, since they are the key
instruments for facilitating Vietnamese private entry further. In January 2000 the new
Enterprise Law came into effect24 , permitting for the first time non-discretionary
registration of private firms, instead of by Government approval, thereby eliminating
bureaucratic steps. It also regulates the approval of establishment of a new business,
which has to be decided within 15 days of the submission of the application. While
this is a very important development, its implementation and enforcement is not yet
consistent. Even though the Government has abolished many licensing requirements a
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large number of licenses still need to be obtained, depending on the field of business.
The momentum for the elimination of unnecessary licenses needs to be maintained.
The Government has announced its intention to promulgate a Decree on SME
Promotion Policies Structure in order to demonstrate a commitment to SME
promotion and its strategy for achieving this. This will provide guidelines on support
measures for private enterprises and SMEs covering areas such as encouragement
policies and the set-up of support institutions. The Decree, originally planned to be
promulgated in 2000, requires promulgation as soon as possible. The government also
recognises the need to encourage the establishment of new SMEs, and to this end
make administrative procedures simpler and more transparent. The problem
concerning bureaucracy and complicated procedures in holding back the development
of SMEs is acknowledged in the SEDS 25 .
Second, the revised Foreign Investment Law and Decision 24 need to be implemented
in the spirit in which they were developed. Foreign investors should be encouraged,
not discouraged, from engaging in joint-ventures with private Vietnamese firms, to
facilitate transfer of technology, and enhance marketing contacts and management
expertise. Third, there is a need to make the regulatory framework for private
participation in infrastructure more transparent and predictable over the medium- term
and conclude some of the build-operate-transfer (BOT) transactions in the power
sector in the short-term. More generally, as recommended in the SEDS,
implementation of equal terms for all enterprises regardless of ownership should be
carried out as soon as possible in all relevant fields, e.g. related to bidding for
Government procurement, access to land and credit etc.
In addition, it will be important to improve the situation concerning land use rights:
Unclear and cumbersome procedures make it very difficult for private SMEs to
acquire land. This presents a major obstacle since access to land use rights is essential,
especially to private enterprises, as collateral for accessing credit. In order to improve
access to land the following steps are necessary: i) clarify and speed up procedures for
land title allocation; ii) unify and modernise registers for land and buildings; iii)
reduce heavy fe es and taxes on registration; iv) provide clear, simple and fair
procedures for resolving disputes.
5.3.2

Strengthening of existing and/or establishment of new relevant institutions and
changing social and administrative attitudes

Ministries and agencies involved in industry, planning, education and training, such as
the Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Planning and Investment, and universities, are
still geared towards support of the SOEs. These organisations will be required to
should shift their focus towards the private sector and SMEs in order to enhance the
general economic environment. This will require a fundamental change in social and
administrative attitudes and a focusing upon an improvement in the image of the
private sector in the country. The vital role of private companies for employment
generation and modernisation of Vietnam should be acknowledged and disseminated
through the media and the educational system at all levels. Given the many years of
discrimination against private enterprises and private entrepreneurs, stronger and
25
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more frequent endorsement of private business by the Vietnamese leadership is
required as was the case in China. Regular public exhortations by top leaders of the
Party and Government to the bureaucracy to provide support to private enterprises
under the law, would be extremely helpful. Stories in the media of domestic private
business successes and visits by top leaders to successful private exporters would help
to reinforce the value of private business in Vietnam’ s development.
Apart from access to capital most SME entrepreneurs consider lack of access to
technical and market information, lack of skilled labour and know-how as their main
business obstacles. The government needs to implement measures that will strengthen
the business environment for SMEs through enhancing the performance of existing
organisations and/or establishing relevant new organisations where appropriate.
Measures agreed upon but still not implemented include the establishment of a
national SME Agency that will co-ordinate consistent SME development. At the
national level a Council for Private Sector Promotion has been proposed to provide a
forum for a regular dialogue between relevant parties such as Government agencies,
local authorities, business organisations/associations and representatives of the private
sector and SMEs. It will also provide advice on private sector and SME
encouragement policies and programs.
Given the importance of mechanical engineering for the industrialisation and
modernisation of Vietnam as well as the enhancement of technical know-how of
entrepreneurs, the Government decided to establish three Technical Assistance
Centres (TACs) (in North, Central and South Vietnam). The TACs not only
concentrate on the enhancement of technical know- how but also support industrial
sub-sectors such as textiles, ceramics, rubber/plastics, food processing and craft
products, by providing engineering experts with experience in specific areas required
by SMEs.
Providing an information system containing data on the latest developments for
private enterprises through an Information Centre for Private Enterprises would
benefit private enterprises. At the provincial and local level the authorities should be
encouraged to incorporate the private sector and SME promotion into their local
development plans. In addition appropriate institutions on the provincial and local
level should be established or strengthened in order to support private business
activities.
Measures that include a strengthened provision of Business Development Services
(BDS) to assist the private sector and SMEs improve their access to resources,
markets, new technologies, qualified labour would be beneficial. International
experience shows that a growing number of private companies are the most flexible
and effective providers of BDS to the diverse and fast changing demands of the
private sector. A number of public organisations, including business associations,
already exist in Vietnam providing these services and they sho uld be part of the future
support to the BDS market as well. Since many SMEs are not aware of the existence
of, and benefits from, BDS and/or are unable to pay market rates, the development of
a well functioning BDS market needs to be supported by the Gove rnment and/or local
authorities.
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In many countries business associations are playing a crucial role in identifying and
advocating the needs and demands of the business community and in establishing a
policy dialogue between the business community and relevant authorities. This has
been acknowledged by the New Enterprise Law, which regulates, and the draft Decree
on SME Promotion Policies Structure, which supports, the establishment and
operation of private business associations.
5.3.3

Easier access to capital

A major constraint facing private SMEs in Vietnam is a shortage of funds. Private
SMEs lack access to long-term loans, an equity financing system, and access to
collateral. The strict collateral requirement by banks and the low incentives for State
Owned Commercial Banks (SOCBs) to lend to SMEs, and on the other hand the
unwillingness of private SMEs to deal with SOCBs, are serious constraints. This
generates a vicious circle that prevents many SMEs from entering the formal credit
sector, and forces them to rely on informal credit. Financial policies have an important
impact on capital mobilisation and development of enterprises. Vietnam’s banking
reforms aim to address the shortages and problems of availability of credit and capital
for the economy. However, the impact of these reforms on the domestic private sector
will continue to remain limited if the private sector continues to experience
difficulties in securing access to land use rights, their potentially most valuable source
of collateral.
The Private Sector Promotion Action Plan (PSPAP), the so called Miyazawa Plan,
agreed between Japan and Vietnam in 1999, includes more than 40 measures to
diminish the constraints faced upon the growth of the private sector. It is based on
three common princ iples: defining Government policy to promote the private sector;
securing equal treatment for private enterprises vis-à-vis SOEs; and granting private
enterprises freedom to conduct business within the laws of Vietnam. A number of
these include measures to improve the financial environment of SMEs. Some of these
have already been implemented such as: the promulgation of the Decree on the
Lending Guarantee; the Circular related to the Auction System; the Decree
Liberalising Transactions involving Land Use Rights in 1999; and the establishment
of the Stock Exchange Centre in 2000.
Others key steps to achieve further improvement in the financial environment for
SMEs are the creation of a Two-step Loan Fund and a Credit Guarantee Fund. An
agreement for a Two-step Loan Fund was signed between the Japan Bank for
International Co-operation (JBIC) and the Government of Vietnam in 1999. It intends
to provide long-term credit to SMEs through selected participating financial
institutions (PFI), including joint stock commercial banks. It is expected that 70
percent of the beneficiaries from this fund will be private SMEs. The Credit
Guarantee Fund for SMEs aims to further encourage financial institutions to lend to
SMEs by absorbing a part of the credit risk, thereby alleviating current borrowing
constraints as a result of their insufficient collateral capacity.
Other measures proposed include further improvement of the regulatory framework
on lending, mortgaging, and leasing, and the pending banking sector reform will also
provide SMEs with better access to credit.
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5.3.4

Trade promotion and export development of SMEs/private enterprises

The government has applied a relaxed policy on restricting imports and exports and,
as a result, the growth in the value of exports and imports from 1992 has increased
rapidly. During the period 1992-1999 the value of exports and imports has increased
more than four times. However, the number of trade licenses given to enterprises in
the private sector only accounts for 15-20 percent of the total number of trade licenses
(Figures from Ministry of Trade, 1998). A number of general trade restrictions
remain. Non-state enterprises are allowed to export commodities produced by them
and can import the input factors necessary to their production. However, they have to
get permission from the Prime Minister if they want to participate in other export and
import activities. At the beginning of 1997 regulations limiting licences on exported
commodities were abandoned. In addition, access to domestic and international
markets for some valuable trade items is severely restricted. Licences to trade in rice,
petroleum, fertiliser, black cement, cars, and motorcycles are only given to a few
favoured enterprises. Only 19 enterprises are allowed to export rice and 25 enterprises
are allowed to import fertiliser. Abandoning these regulations would greatly increase
trading opportunities.
In addition to requiring export or import licenses, the Ministry of Trade still has the
right to require specific additional licenses related to certain groups of exported or
imported commodities. Furthermore, for some commodities additional export or
import licenses must be obtained from the line ministries. The tariff system also
remains extremely complicated with many tariff lines, and nominal rates are high and
the range of tariff rates is excessively wide. The system of tariff codes is not
compatible with the system of product codes.
While trade procedures have gradually improved a number of problems remain.
Institutional support for trade is still not available. Effective measures to prevent a
large inflow of smuggled goods are not available. Some policy measures, such as the
90/CP or 91/CP decrees, which established the state-owned general corporations, and
the specia l preferential treatment to SOEs though the credit and trade policies, are
disadvantaging SMEs in the private sector.
More recently, the promulgation of three new implementing Decrees related to the
New Enterprise Law in 2000, and the removal of some quantitative restrictions in
import management, represent a significant step forward in improving the trade and
business environment for private sector development and SME support in Vietnam.
Export licensing and trade management by quota is becoming less important than in
the past. However some of the quotas now accessible to private enterprises need to be
further opened up, and the bidding system should be more transparent. Also, special
attention should be directed at the proper implementation of the new decrees,
regulations and instructions of the Government.
At present, the major obstacle preventing SMEs from seizing trade opportunities is
their limited experience of global trade. Fragmentary knowledge and understanding of
foreign markets are some of the basic trade barriers. This applies not only for
information about management accounting, technical requirements, marketing skills,
import regulations and consumer preferences, but also for assessing the suitability of
imported goods. Limited language skills of the entrepreneurs are also a problem. Lack
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of these fundamental skills could be a severe problem when Vietnam further
integrates into the global economy in the coming years.
Overcoming these difficulties requires not only an extended exposure of Vietnamese
entrepreneurs to the world market, but also an intensive teaching and training of
SMEs. Tapping into the expertise existing in neighbouring and other foreign countries
would be particularly beneficial.
Beyond the information gap, the low level of competitiveness and the restricted ability
to produce larger numbers of identical items of similar quality and on time are other
severe trade barriers for local SMEs. Therefore, tailor- made quality management
systems have to be propagated and implemented in order to enhance SMEs export
opportunities.
5.3.5

Image of the private sector

The image of the private sector has to be improved in the country. The vital role of
private companies for employment generation and modernisation of Vietnam should
be acknowledged and disseminated through the media and the educational system at
all levels. Negative social and administrative attitudes towards private enterprises
impact adversely upon behaviour towards those engaged in private activities. They
influence individua l’s decisions to enter the private sector and, once entered, constrain
their ability to unleash their full potential. Growing one’s business and increasing its
visibility through success is seen as a risky proposition by many entrepreneurs in
Vietnam, because private business has tended to be viewed negatively.
With greater freedom for the private sector also comes the need for improved
corporate governance. There are at least three problems of corporate governance that
will need to be addressed if the private sector is to grow in a transparent, accountable
and effective manner. First, a key characteristic of the private SMEs is that their
organisations are quite opaque. Not only is the ownership-structure of most of these
SMEs not known but also the way decisions are made is unclear. This is not much of
a problem when firms are small, but as they become bigger and owner- managers’
span of control is less adequate, absence of appropriate decision- making processes
will constrain their growth. Second, most SMEs now do not maintain sufficient
accounts or make any public disclosure of their accounts. Various types of restrictions
and insufficient social acceptance of business success leads SMEs to misreport
financial and other flows, when reporting is required. In the coming decade, it will be
necessary to put in place the framework that will ensure that such enterprises act in a
transparent and accountable manner.
6.

Implementing an effective Competition Policy

From the earlier sections of this paper it is apparent that if Vietnam is to move
forward to become a more market-oriented economy, the implementation of an
effective competition policy is essential. There are a number of key ingredients.
Firstly there is a need for ongoing ownership reform, and the generation of growth of
new private enterprises. This requires a removal of barriers to new business so that
entry into markets for all forms of ownership is free. In this regard encouragement to
the growth of SMEs in industry, agriculture and transport, and especially in services
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where the greatest deficiency previously existed. This adds to economic activity,
greater competition and efficiency in existing markets, and the development of new
products and markets. Ownership reform can be seen as an evolutionary process in
which the state and private sectors exist permanently side by side. The relative size of
the private sector steadily increasing through time due to: the entry of new private
firms; through the sale of certain state property rights at fair prices: and through the
liquidation of inefficient state owned enterprises that prove to be unviable. All these
three processes should be encouraged but not forced, allowing scope for
experimentation and trials of various forms of ownership reform.
Secondly, encouragement should be given to foreign capital investment in the
country. This not only alleviates the acute shortage of capital but also paves the way
for attaining new technologies, adopting modern management methods, enhancing the
skills of domestic workers, and gaining access to foreign markets. Foreign capital
should not be encouraged to go into certain markets and not into others. Traditionally
in Vietnam foreign capital was encouraged to go into import substituting sectors, were
more capital intensive and their production aimed at satisfying domestic demand. As a
result such investment did not focus upon those sectors of the economy where the
country’s comparative advantage lies, that is in the production of export oriented
labour intensive manufactured goods. Restrictions on foreign sector investment,
therefore, should be eliminated.
Thirdly, unviable state owned enterprises should be allowed to exit the market, and
their resources put to more efficient and productive uses elsewhere in the economy.
This will require exit mechanisms such as the introduction of bankruptcy and
liquidation procedures. This is also an important component in the process of
ownership reform, requiring greater involvement by the private sector in their
ownership and management including in the form of privatisation (equitisation).
Remaining state owned enterprises should be subject to hard budget constraints.
Finally, a level playing field in terms of access to markets and fair competition
between the various forms of ownership needs to be created. Public ownership should
not be forced out where it is capable of standing up to market competition, while there
should be no discrimination against private ownership. The state as a buyer should not
make public procurement decisions based on the form of ownership of the seller,
instead purchases should be made on the basis of which seller offers the best price and
conditions.
7.

Summary and conclusions

Ongoing reform in Vietnam will require the revitalisation and equitisation
(privatisation) of the country’s many unprofitable SOEs, the development of a robust
and dynamic private sector, as well as a further opening of the economy to foreign
investment, competition, and trade. This reform, in the short term, runs the danger of
increased unemployment and rising poverty, and potential social unrest that the
authorities would wish to avoid. Such instability could be avoided if reform proceeds
slowly, but would likely contribute to a stagnating economy that would fall further
behind its already reforming regional neighbours. Hence the authorities face difficult
choices. This paper has argued that the role of SMEs, particularly in the private sector,
have the potential to play a crucial role in the future development of the economy by:
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harnessing latent entrepreneurial zeal; creating new jobs for those made unemployed
by a restructuring of state enterprises, and for those living in the countryside; bringing
about a more efficient allocation of resources in line with the country’s comparative
advantage; expanding exports; bringing about a more equitable distribution of
income; alleviating poverty in the rural sector; and promoting regional development.
To date their contribution to the economy remains below what it could be, as
demonstrated by the experiences of its regional neighbours. Hence greater emphasis
needs to be placed upon their development.
A World Bank report observed that allowing farmers greater freedom of decisionmaking after the introduction of Doi Moi in 1986 made possible the agricultural
growth that was “the main engine for Vietnam’s first great wave of growth” (World
Bank, 1998, p.30). It recommended that “unshackling SMEs from existing restrictions
could unleash a second round of growth by boosting labour- intensive manufactures
and processed agricultural exports, thereby protecting rural areas from the current
slowdown” (ibid.). To date, however, private SMEs (that is registered private firms,
have, according to the Bank, “played a minor role in industrial production,
contributing only two percent of industrial output and have grown very slowly.
Household enterprises play a much larger role” (ibid.).
The most cost-effective way of generating non-agricultural employment in Vietnam,
according to a World Bank Consultative Group, is through promoting SMEs, that is
registered private companies with between 50 and 300 employees (World Bank, 1998,
p.29). Each job generated in an SME is estimated to require a capital investment of
about US$800, compared with an investment of US$18,000 in a State Owned
Enterprise (SOE) (op.cit. pp. 29-30). This conforms, says the Bank, to empirical
evidence from other countries indicating that SMEs are more efficient users of capital
under most conditions.
In line with this evidence the Government has stated that it will support the
development of SMEs through favourable policies and assistance in finance, market
information and staff training (specified in a draft strategy to develop SMEs in
Vietnam to 2010 prepared by the MPI). To support SMEs, the Vietnam Chamber of
Commerce and Industry is working with relevant agencies, including the MPI, on the
establishment of a credit guarantee system. It is clear that further government support
is needed to help SMEs develop. It will be necessary to offer additional tax incentives,
and support in funds and floor space to develop production, as well as to devise
reasonable financial policies to attract money from the public and encourage effective
investment by the private sector. Priority for enterprises will need to be given to trade
categories focused upon traditional trades, handicraft, consumer goods, exports and
hi-tech products. In addition, the State needs to reform the way it manages SMEs, so
that procedures can be simplified and made easier to implement. SME development in
the rural sector to expand employment and reduce poverty should also be given
priority.
If the changes in policy identified in this chapter address the four key areas of:
enhancing the legal environment for SMEs; strengthening existing and developing
new institutions; enable easier access to finance; trade promotion and export
development; and improving the image of, and attitudes to, the private sector as well
as its corporate governance, then the optimistic growth of the private sector outlined
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in the SEDS can be achieved. In addition, the implementation of a competition policy
that focuses upon ownership reform and the elimination of market barriers to entry,
encourages foreign investment, enables the closure of unviable enterprises, and puts
all forms of ownership on an equal basis, will be an essential pre-requisite for the
growth of the private sector and a return to high and sustainable growth. As China,
another transition economy, has demonstrated, private firms, if given the right
environment, can grow rapidly, from 100,000 to 1 million in number in just 6 years
and make a major contribution to the economy. In the case of China, however, there is
clear commitment from the government to bring about this structural transformation,
while for Vietnam there is still the perception that the authorities are dragging their
feet.
Despite the capital- intensive nature of much of Vietnam’s growth, there have been
encouraging signs in the last few years of the emergence of a labour-intensive export
sector. Changes in trade policies have been an essential component of the doi moi
policy adopted since 1986. Licensed private companies are now allowed to engage
directly in international trade, breaking the trade monopoly of a small number of state
owned enterprises operating under central or provincial authorities. However, until
very recently, private enterprises had to satisfy a number of fairly restrictive
conditions to obtain the necessary licenses. The recent removal of trade licensing,
allowing companies to freely engage in trade within the registered scope of their
business activities, should further improve the environment for export oriented
industries. In addition, over the years, most export quotas have been lifted and export
taxes have been reduced to generally very low levels. These reforms, together with
sound macroeconomic management, have allowed Vietnam to exploit its comparative
advantage in labour intensive manufactures, putting the country on track for export
led growth. This is a major lesson to be learned from the rapid growth of its regional
neighbours.
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